Unlike the current national identity card, a biometric card has an electronic chip. When scanned, this chip provides sensitive information on the card owner, including their name, photo, address and fingerprint. Anyone with a reader can scan such chips.

This information is already featured on the current card*; the only difference is the electronic chip. According to government estimates, the change to biometric cards would cost nearly 30 million dinars, at a time when Tunisia is going through a major economic crisis. What would this change bring about?

The main arguments put forward by its proponents include the digitalization and simplification of administrative procedures and a reduced risk of identity theft or document forgery. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the biometric card will " improve security, " particularly in the fight against terrorism.

AN OPAQUE PROJECT

As soon as the project was presented to the Council of Ministers in August 2016, a number of associations, including Al Bawsala and Access Now, sought to obtain the full text in order to scrutinize it.

But gaining access to the document proved challenging. Wafa Ben Hassine, former MENA strategic advisor for Access Now, repeatedly called for the document’s release, but to no avail. " People who had information about it didn't want to hand it over, [...] I felt like I had to beg them to get this text!" she states.

Despite the difficulties of accessing the details, the content of the project had already raised a red flag for many associations. The proposed system would allow for the collection of personal information of all Tunisians, without specifying where it would be stored, how long it would be kept, or who exactly would have access to it. Nor would the citizens be allowed to access this database... not even to check their own information; trying to do so improperly would risk a five-year prison sentence.

THE RISKS OF THE BIOMETRIC SYSTEM

Members of civil society compare this type of system to a " national filing system." The database outlined in the draft law would violate Article 24 of the Tunisian Constitution, which states that " the state protects the right to privacy and the inviolability of the home and the confidentiality of correspondence, communications, and personal information." Some activists also fear the misuse of the chipped card. As the card can be read remotely, citizens could be tracked, without their knowledge or consent..

On November 18, 2016, given the associated risks of the project, six associations issued a press release calling on the ARP to reject it. They pointed out that the Ministry of the Interior had not consulted the National Personal Data Protection Authority (INPDP) in drafting this text, which, as an independent institution, " may [have] issued an advisory opinion on any matter relating to personal data."**

Data protection concerns were exacerbated by the fact that the company in charge of creating these cards has yet to be identified. As explained by Emna Sayadi of Access Now, " to produce these biometric cards, most states use an external, and often foreign, company, which would have access to all this data." She refers to other countries such as Morocco and India, which have already established this type of system through partnerships with French companies. Doing so puts important personal data of citizens at risk.

India’s Aadhaar system has presented the country with multiple problems since 2009. On several occasions, the Indian government contracted external operators to register its citizens within the database. Despite the government’s intention to only grant temporary access to the contents of the database, some operators retained access to sensitive citizen information. One English journalist was able to obtain an ID by paying an agent less than 10 euros. Using this point of access, the journalist was then able to access the server containing data on 1.2 billion Indian citizens, in just a few minutes. 

In addition to this security breach, the Aadhaar system has other limitations; misidentifications have prevented hundreds of thousands of people from using social programs, for instance, to obtain food at subsidized prices. The slightest input error in the system, or a power outage during a transaction, could hinder access to these services. Responding to this system failure on February 20, 2018, the Indian government decided to suspend the use of the biometric system in stores that supply subsidized products.

A LOW PRIORITY DEBATE

Despite the high stakes, the issue of the Tunisian biometric card has long been brushed aside, both in public discourse and within the ARP. After being approved by the Council of Ministers in August 2016, the draft law was sent to the Commission on Rights, Freedoms, and External Relations (‘the Commission’) for review.

But parliamentary processes are often lengthy and convoluted, and the subject of biometric cards was no exception. Ignored for several months, it was only in May 2017 that the project was put back on track, " probably under pressure from the Ministry of the Interior," says Wafa Ben Hassine of Access Now. The date for the plenary debate was set for July 19.

" The Ministry of the Interior insisted on having these debates as soon as possible, and emphasized the importance of the project for the country, since it has the potential to protect us from terrorism, to modernize the country, etc.," says Emna Sayadi.

The members of the Commission agreed to hear arguments from Chawki Gaddes, the president of the INPDP, and representatives of the Ministry of the Interior. While members of the government insisted on the practical and secure nature of the proposed system, Gaddes claimed that there are not enough provisions to guarantee the protection of personal data. 

Despite Gaddes' concerns, MPs have only made minor amendments to date, such as including the possibility for married Tunisian women to not mention their husbands' names on their ID cards. Instead of discussing the substantive issues, " [MPs] focused on logistics, how it was going to be financed, what happens when the card is lost, etc.," says Emna Sayadi.

On July 7, 2017, the Commission approved the preliminary text and sent it for legislative plenary. Wafa Ben Hassine calls this decision “ catastrophic.” The draft was scheduled to be discussed in the plenary chamber about ten days later. 

However, the ARP had other priorities at the time. Debates circled around other issues, including the draft law concerning violence against women. Other important issues, including that of the biometric identity card, were put on hold.  In the end, the case of ID cards was sent back to the Commission.

NEW AMENDMENTS

The legislative and bureaucratic delays came as a relief for many members of Tunisian civil society. Several associations took advantage of the delays by coming together to define a strategy. As explained by Mohamed Ben Hamida of Al Bawsala, " We realized the scope of this bill and the dangers it posed to constitutional rights and freedoms [in Tunisia] [...] So, we decided to step up the pace.”

With the support of Chawki Gaddes, Access Now and Al Bawsala worked together to  recommend new amendments for the members of the Commission to adopt. 

At the beginning of 2018, the course of events regarding the bill accelerated. The plenary debate on the project was scheduled for January 9, and the Commission, now with a new composition, resumed their discussions. This time, however, MPs seemed more sensitive to the risks associated with this bill. As stated by Mohammed Ben Hamida, " they wanted to know if this project was primarily directed towards administrative or security concerns." 

Access Now representatives Wafa Ben Hassine and Emna Sayadi were in contact with some of the Commission’s members. Representing different political parties, these members alerted the Access Now staff of the schedule and progress of their meetings and discussions. This allowed activists to express their opinions about the biometric system and suggest recommendations more directly.

On January 4, 2018, Chawki Gaddes, the president of the INPDP,  addressed the commission for a second time. At the same time, Al Bawsala and Access Now activists forwarded their recommendations to the president of the Commission and to at least one representative from each political party.

" Some members were asking “How was this project passed [the first time]? It’s ridiculous,’" says Emna Sayadi.

The following day, it was the turn of representatives of the Ministry of the Interior to be heard. One of the representatives appeared with a biometric card reader in his hand and presented it to the members of the Commission. As recalled by Wafa Ben Hassine, he then said, " So, here's the machine. You just insert the card and it works. It's incredible." According to Emna Sayadi," it was as if he was trying to sell [them] something."

The Ministry representatives expressed no concern regarding the possibility of data being stolen. According to Ben Hassine’s account of the hearings, the Ministry of the Interior’s representatives assured the room that " [their] Ministry is the strongest of all ministries… [and] all data will be secured." The MPs who expressed their doubts and skepticism towards this claim were faced with an almost threatening response: " What, you don't trust the Ministry of the Interior?” This in turn provoked a reaction by the president of the Commission, who asked,

“ Is this a state run by confidence and trust, or by law?” 

" It was a real battle between the Ministry and the Commission," says Wafa Ben Hassine.

Following this proceeding, the “Consensus Commission” met on Monday, January 8, 2018. The Consensus Commission, composed of influential members of the Assembly, met behind closed doors in the absence of civil society members. Even though their decisions and agreements are (legally) non-binding, they are largely respected during voting in the legislative plenary.  

" On this occasion, the Consensus Commission, even if illegal, played in our favor," admits Wafa Ben Hassine. The MPs took the recommendations by civil society into account and adopted three amendment modifications to the draft law. 

The first amendment concerned how electronic chips could be read. It proposed that the chip must be read by contact and not from a distance. This was meant to prevent the data contained in the card from being accessed without the cardholder's consent.

A second amendment was proposed to allow citizens to access the data on their ID card to ensure transparency on the stored data and allow for the correction of errors.

Finally, according to the third modification, the photo and fingerprint cannot be stored after the identity card has been issued.

" So, suddenly, there was no longer any question of a database," explains Emna Sayadi, " it was completely abandoned.”

THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BILL

On Monday January 8, a day before the scheduled plenary debate of the bill, rumours began to circulate that the Ministry of the Interior was considering abandoning the biometric card because it was not satisfied with the latest, more data-secure, amendments. 

Due to the demonstrations across the country on the day of the debate, the general agenda of the plenary was cancelled and the scheduled debates were postponed to later in the afternoon. Doubts regarding the future of the bill persisted until 3pm, when " just before the debate, the Vice-President of the Assembly announced that she had received a statement from the Ministry of the Interior stating that the bill had been abandoned," recalled Emna Sayadi.

Even though this was a victory for civil society, Wafa Ben Hassine pointed out that “ we [,the civil society,] would almost have preferred the law to pass, as we had made sure to protect the personal data of Tunisians [through the amendments] […] The deletion of the database is already a big achievement!"

Activists also remain cautious because the withdrawal of this bill does not mean it will never return in another form. Ben Hassine fears this could, for instance, be done " by government decree," which is a method for the Ministry of the Interior to avoid parliamentary scrutiny.